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Introduction 
On February 14, 2002, President Bush announced a Clear Skies Initiative that 
proposes, among other things, to reduce the existing cap on total SO2 emissions 
from approximately 8.9 million tons under the existing provisions of Title IV of the 
1990 Clean Air Act Amendments to 4.5 million tons starting in 2010 and to 3.0 
million tons starting in 2018. The proposed reductions in the SO2 cap are similar 
to that facing the 263 generating units that were mandated to be subject to 
Phase I under Title IV and which occasioned a significant amount of early over-
control and consequent banking of a llowances for later use. If enacted, there is 
every reason to believe that electric utilities would similarly engage in banking 
behavior prior to the reductions in the cap. Accordingly, any evaluation of the 
costs and economic effects of this proposal must make some assumption about 
banking. 
The first section of this paper briefly describes banking and summarizes the 
grounds for concluding that banking behavior under Title IV has been largely 
rational, and therefore nearly optimal. This conclusion is the subject of another 
paper now being written by Juan Pablo Montero and myself and the most that 
can be done here is to adumbrate the argument.  In the following section, the 
simple model that closely tracks observed banking behavior under Title IV is 
used to simulate the response to the proposed further reductions in the SO2 cap. 
The results reported concern marginal and total costs of abatement, emission 
levels, allowance prices, and the value of the existing endowment of allowances. 
This section is then following by one presenting a sensitivity analysis in which the 
three principal uncertainties—the timing and levels of the reduced caps, the 
discount rate, and the predicted rate of growth in counterfactual emissions—are 
varied; and a final section concludes. 
Banking in Theory and under Title IV 
The basic theory of emissions banking is well developed and can be quickly 
summarized.1 If emissions banking is allowed, agents will over-control in the 
current period and bank allowances for later use whenever they expect future 
marginal abatement cost discounted to the present to be greater than current 
marginal cost. Doing so causes marginal costs in the current period to rise and 
the discounted, expected future marginal costs to fall. And, when the opposite 
                                                 
1  See Rubin (1996), Kling and Rubin (1997), Cronshaw and Kruse (1996), and Schennach (2000). The 
latter two address Title IV explicitly. 
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condition obtains, namely, discounted expected marginal costs are lower than 
current marginal costs, agents will draw down the accumulated allowance bank 
until the temporal equality of discounted marginal abatement cost is established. 
The result is that allowance p rices rise at the discount rate over the banking 
period, which can be defined as a complete cycle of accumulation and draw 
down.  
Emissions banking is identical in all essential characteristics to the accumulation 
and draw down of inventory for any commodity.2 Emissions and allowances may 
differ for any given sub-period, but over the complete cycle of accumulation and 
draw-down, the cumulative totals will be equal, just as cumulative production and 
cumulative consumption will be equal over any standard inventory cycle.  The 
chief difference between the two is that allowance banking, as least as observed 
in Title IV, occurs over a much longer cycle because the reduction of the cap that 
distinguishes Phase II from Phase I creates a much greater difference in 
marginal cost than is ever true of the stochastic variation in production and 
consumption from year to year that rules inventory behavior for more standard 
commodities.  
The general banking problem and how it might be solved under Title IV is 
illustrated in Figure 1.  
F igure  1 :  Opt ima l  Aba tement  Programs
(by discount  rate,  g  = 2 .0%)
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The bold line indicates the amount of abatement that would have been required 
in each year without banking, that is, if units had emitted in the aggregate in each 
year as much as allowed by the allowances issued for use in each of those 
                                                 
2  The classic treatment of inventory behavior provided by Williams and Wright (1991) can be readily 
adapted to emissions banking. 
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years.3 Since marginal abatement cost increases with the quantity of abatement, 
the reduction of the cap in 2000 occasions a sharp increase in marginal cost that 
will cause rational agents to over-control in Phase I and to bank the unused 
allowances for later use in smoothing the transition to the Phase II cap. Three 
examples of optimal banking programs and the resulting emissions paths—
corresponding to nominal discount rates of 5%, 10% and 15%—are illustrated in 
Figure 1. Lower discount rates place a higher present value on future costs and 
therefore call forth more early abatement, a larger bank at the end of Phase I, 
and a longer period of drawing down the accumulated bank.  
Another way to illustrate the problem and to compare what has happened so far 
under Title IV is to plot the evolution of the bank over time, as is done in Figure 2.  
Figure 2: Optimal Banking Programs
(expressed as end-of-year bank)
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Each of the ascending and descending lines indicate the cumulative bank, or the 
difference between allowances available for use in each year and emissions 
under an optimal banking program for each of the indicated discount rates. The 
bold, broken line in Figure 2 indicates the actual development of the allowance 
bank through 2000 and it corresponds almost exactly with what would have been 
called for using a 6% discount rate. The clear inference, assuming electric 
utilities are acting rationally, is that the discount rate applied to the holding of 
allowances has been 6%. 
The choice of an appropriate discount rate is always difficult, but it can be 
established independently, as is done for a variety of common inventory 
                                                 
3  The amount of abatement required in each year during Phases I and II increases because counterfactual 
emissions, what would have been emitted but for Title IV, are assumed to increase at 2% annually.  
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problems, using standard techniques of financial economics, such as the capital 
asset pricing model (CAPM).  The forthcoming paper by Montero and me applies 
this model and finds that allowance prices have zero correlation with equity 
returns, regardless of estimation technique or equity index, which implies in turn 
that the risk associated with holding SO2 allowances can be completely 
diversified and that the appropriate discount to be applied to holding SO2 
allowances is the risk-free rate. This rate has averaged 6% from 1994 through 
2000. Accordingly, we conclude that emissions banking under Title IV has been 
optimal.  
Application of Optimal Banking to the Proposed Reduced Caps 
The conclusion that Title IV banking has been optimal greatly simplifies 
evaluation of the effects of the reduction in the SO2 cap proposed by the Bush 
Administration, assuming that the proposal survives the legislative and regulatory 
process in as pure a cap-and-trade form as was true for Title IV of the 1990 
Clean Air Act Amendments. In particular, this assumption of rational behavior 
frees analysis of this proposal from the ad hoc institutionalism that so bedeviled 
early analysis of Title IV.4  
The problem to be solved now is how to change an already existing banking 
program in mid-stream to incorporate the new constraints. Analysis of the change 
in banking program is simplified by assuming that the President’s proposal is 
enacted now, or equivalently that agents assign a 100% probability to its 
enactment in identical or equivalent form and stringency. Such a high probability 
is unlikely, but that agents are incorporating a non-trivial probability is beyond 
question. 5 In actuality, varying leve ls of probability will be incorporated into 
allowance prices, and therefore into abatement decisions and the resulting 
emission levels, as the prospects for enactment wax and wane. The effects of 
the proposal can be understood best, not by attempting to simulate all the effects 
of the transition from proposal to enactment, but by ignoring the transition and 
simply assuming, for the sake of analysis, that the proposal has been instantly 
translated into reality.  
The model to be applied to this mid-stream change is only slightly different from a 
standard banking problem. Agents start out with positive allowance holdings 
(instead of zero as at the beginning of 1995) and they now face additional, 
previously unexpected increases in marginal abatement cost as the cap is 
reduced from the Title IV level of 8.9 million tons to 4.5 million tons in 2010 and 
3.0 million tons in 2018. Assuming all else is unchanged, agents will incorporate 
the new abatement requirements into their banking programs such that 
                                                 
4  To some extent, the early, less rigorous analysis of Title IV was unavoidable since it had no precedent. 
For instance, the beta for allowances could not have been estimated since no markets for this or any similar 
asset had existed before. Sti ll, it is surprising how little analysts attempted to treat banking rigorously even 
though virtually recognized that some banking would occur. Estimates for the end-of-Phase I bank ranged 
from two to fifteen million tons and the actual bank was 11.65 million tons. 
5  For instance, Air Daily reported, in its first weekly report on SO2 prices after the President’s 
announcement, that “Bush’s proposal…has pushed SO2 prices sharply higher (to) $169 on Friday, up $9 
from the week before.” Given a certainty equivalent increase in price (to be developed shortly), this increase 
can be seen as an instant handicapping of the probability of enactment. 
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discounted marginal costs are brought into equality over the appropriate banking 
period. With a significant reduction of the cap at about the time the existing bank 
of allowances would otherwise have been exhausted, agents will undertake 
additional control efforts before 2010 and extend the banking period for some 
years beyond 2010, and perhaps after 2018. Moreover, the effects will not be 
limited to the years surrounding 2010 or 2018. The effect will reach back to the 
present time and lead to an increase in current allowance prices and abatement 
effort.   
The basic banking model is relatively simple although the equations may look 
forbidding. An abatement cost function must be assumed and the same form as 
that used in the forthcoming paper by Montero and me concerning Title IV 
banking behavior is used here to express marginal and total abatement cost. 
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The respective costs in period t depend upon the quantity of abatement in that 
period, qt, and two time-invariant parameters, a scaling parameter a, which 
relates the quantity and price metrics, and a convexity parameter b, which 
indicates the extent to which marginal abatement cost rises with the quantity of 
abatement. Several earlier studies and analysis by this author and colleagues at 
MIT suggest that aggregate abatement costs are linear (b=1.0) and this 
assumption leads to the expression in equation 2) for the equality of allowances 
and emissions over the banking period. 
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The left-hand-side of equation 2) states the number of allowances available 
during the banking period, which is the number of allowances held in the bank at 
the time it becomes certain that the cap will be reduced, B0, plus all the 
allowances that will become available for use in covering emissions with each 
succeeding year until t, the end of the banking period. The right-hand-side of the 
equation expresses cumulative emissions over the banking period, which is the 
difference between cumulative counterfactual emissions (u0 at t = 0 , growing at 
the annual rate of g) and cumulative abatement over the same period. The last 
term, cumulative abatement, is the product of the abatement required at the end 
of the banking period, t, and the integral expressing the accumulation over the 
banking period which depends on the discount rate, r.  
Equation (1) can be solved for t using known or reasonable values for all the 
parameters and variables in the equation. A reasonable estimate of the size of 
the bank at the end of 2001 is 8.9 million allowances. The number of tons 
allowed during 2002-2009 will be 9.35 million tons annually;6 during 2010-2017, 
                                                 
6  This amount is slightly higher than the 8.9 million ton cap frequently cited because of additional bonus 
allowances made available during the early years of Phase II. In 2000, the number of allowances issued was 
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4.5 million tons annually; and thereafter, 3.0 million tons annually. Counterfactual 
emissions at the end of 2001 are estimated at 18.16 million tons and the growth 
rate in these emissions is assumed to be 2.0% per annum indefinitely. Finally, 
the dramatic reduction of interest rates in the course of 2001 has rendered a 
discount rate of 6.0% too high for the present. An appropriate risk-free rate would 
be that on a five- or ten-year Treasury note, which can be taken to reflect the 
average holding period for a banked allowance, and that rate is about 4.5%. 
Figure 3 shows the results for emissions and the bank using these assumptions. 
F i g u r e  3 :  E m i s s i o n s ,  C a p s ,  a n d  t h e  B a n k  ( 4 . 5 % ,  2 % )
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The bold line with three descending steps is the proposed cap and the dashed 
lines indicate the paths of emissions and of the cumulative bank as each would 
be if the cap remained at the level of the first step. The solid lines indicate what 
will occur with the reduction of the cap. Without a reduction in the cap and with a 
4.5% discount rate, the cumulative bank would have been drawn down slowly 
and it would have been exhausted around 2013. The reductions in the cap justify 
considerably more abatement prior to 2010 and a much longer banking period 
that would now extend to 2022. Abatement in the current period increases by 
about 1.75 million tons and the entire emissions path throughout the banking 
period shifts downward in a manner than smoothes the transition to the eventua l 
6 million ton reduction in emissions. Holders of allowances also resume the 
accumulation of a bank that will increase to almost 20 million tons before the 
draw down phase begins in 2010.  
Figure 4 shows the same effect in the domain of prices.  
                                                                                                                                                 
9.94 million. 9.35 million is the average annual amount assuming that the amount available declines linearly 
from 9.9 in 2000 to 8.9 in 2009. 
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Figure 4:  Expected Nominal  Pr ices and Present  Values
( r  =  4 .5%,  g  =  2 .0%)
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The two lines rising steadily from around $200 in 2002 represent the marginal 
cost of abatement before and after the reductions in the cap. The immediate 
increase in nominal prices is about $44, or 24%,7 and the difference in the 
marginal cost of abatement increases steadily until it reaches about $140/ton or 
about 34% at the end of the banking period in 2021.  
The two declining lines in Figure 4 indicate the present value of an allowance of 
the vintages corresponding to the years along the horizontal axis before and after 
enactment. Since allowances are distributed for thirty years forward, the 
allowances that will be used from 2002 through 2031 are already in compliance 
accounts and the sum of these present values represents the endowment value 
of each thirty-year, one-allowance stream. The President’s proposal is silent on 
how allowances of vintages 2010 through 2031 would be handled, but the 
presumption must be that the legislation would declare allowances of vintages 
2010 through 2017 valid for covering half a ton instead of a full ton, and those for 
vintages after 2017 valid for one-third of a ton. 8 Doing so would mean that the 
allocations for these years had been reduced from approximately 9 million tons to 
4.5 and 3.0 million tons. Doing so would also create three classes of allowances: 
Class 1 consisting of allowances of vintages 2009 and earlier; Class 2 consisting 
of allowances of vintages 2010 through 2017; and Class 3 consisting of 
allowances of vintages 2018 and later.  A Class 1 allowance would always be 
equal to the marginal cost of abatement and worth two Class 2 allowances or 
                                                 
7  Assuming certainty of enactment as proposed. The $9 increase in allowance prices observed after the 
President’s announcement suggests that the instant handicappers were placing a 20% probability on 
enactment of legislation having equivalent effect. 
8  It is worth noting perhaps that any attempt to apply the reduced coverage ratio to banked allowances will 
lead to the use of all allowances before their devaluation. This would imply not only no banking but also the 
use of the entire existing bank prior to 2010 and considerably higher emissions between now and 2010. 
Analysis of Bush Cap  8 
February 25, 2002 
 
three Class 3 allowances, since these latter would be worth only that fraction of 
the marginal cost of abatement for which they can be used.  
Under the current law and assuming that the current price reflects an equilibrium 
value, allowances of vintages out to the end of the banking period have a present 
value equal to their current price and later vintages have a lower present value 
since marginal cost does not rise at the discount rate after the end of the banking 
period in 2014. The effect of reducing the cap is to increase the value of the 
Class 1 allowances by $44 each, while the value of Class 2 and Class 3 
allowances is reduced, as indicated, by the product of the changes in the 
coverage fraction and in marginal abatement cost. Table 1 summarizes the 
changes in the value of the allowances in each class and as a whole.  
Table 1: SO2 Allowance Endowment Value 
(30-year stream of one allowance as of 1/1/02, 4.5% discount) 
 Class 1 
(2002 – 2009) 
Class 2 
(2010 – 17) 
Class 3 
(2018 - 31) 
Total 
(2002 – 31) 
After $1,709 $    855 $    911 $ 3,475 
Before $1,387 $ 1,376 $ 2,108 $4,871 
Difference + $ 322 - $ 521 - $ 1,197 -$ 1,396 
% Change + 23% - 38% - 57% - 29% 
The total present value of each endowed 30-year, one-allowance stream is 
reduced by 29%, from almost $5,000 to about $3,500 per stream, but this 
outcome is the net effect of the 23% increase in the present value of Class 1 
allowances and the 38% and 57% reductions in the present value of Class 2 and 
Class 3 allowances, respectively.  
If marginal costs can be simulated, the total abatement costs can also be 
estimated, as indicated by equation 1).  For this purpose, a value of 22 is given to 
the scaling parameter, a, to scale the early 2002 “before” price to approximately 
$175. Table 2 presents the estimated annual total costs for the current year 
2002; for 2015, the year after the bank would have been drawn down without the 
proposed reductions of the cap; and for 2025, a year after the extended bank will 
have been exhausted.  
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Table 2: Total SO2 Abatement Costs, 
(undiscounted millions of nominal 2002$) 
 2002 2015 2025 
Total Cost After $1,085 $3,471 $7,470 
Total Cost Before $747 $2,371 $4,400 
Difference + $338 + $1,126 + $3,070 
% Increase + 45% + 47% + 70% 
The “before” costs for 2002 are approximately what others have projected 
without consideration of the lower cap (Ellerman et al., 2000; Carlson et al., 
1998).  Since it is not completely certain that the proposed legislation will be 
enacted, the 45% increase in costs for 2002 will not occur, although some portion 
of it may to the extent that the proposed higher costs are incorporated into the 
expectations that determine current allowance prices. Nevertheless, the 
magnitudes are indicative.  In general, and assuming passage of the legislation 
as proposed, annual costs for abating SO2 emissions would increase by about 
half in the early years, including years before 2010, and by about 70% after the 
3.0 million ton cap has been fully achieved. 
Sensitivity Cases 
The results reported above provide a good indication of the direction and general 
magnitude of the effects of reducing the SO2 cap. Changing the assumptions 
behind this illustrative but realistic model will lead to different results of course 
but the basic result will remain. The cost incurred by reducing the SO2 cap will 
not be restricted to those future years when the cap is actually reduced. Banking 
will redistribute those costs over the years surrounding the time when the cap is 
reduced, including the present, in a manner that will be cost-reducing.  
In this section, three variations are discussed briefly: changing the timing and 
levels of the reduced cap, a higher discount rate, and a lower rate of growth in 
counterfactual emissions. The effects of these variations, as well as of the base 
case, are most easily comprehended if the reader keeps in mind that what 
counts, when banking is allowed and used by affected parties, is the cumulative 
required reduction in emissions over a relevant economic horizon that is defined 
by the discount rate and the expected increase in marginal abatement cost.  
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Changes in the Level and Timing of the Reduced Caps 
The importance of the cumulative required reduction in emissions can be 
illustrated by varying the timing and level of the reduced cap in a manner that is 
offsetting, for instance, by moving the proposed 2010 reduction of the cap 
forward one year but raising the level of the new 2009-2017 cap by an amount 
that would equal, over the eight years 2010-2018, the reduction in allowed 
emissions in 2009. The effects of this offsetting variation are shown in the second 
data row of Table 3. 
Table 3: Variations in the 
Level and Timing of Reduced Caps 
 Initial 
Emissions 
(million tons) 
Maximum 
Bank 
(million tons) 
End of 
Banking 
(years) 
Base Case 8.45 19.66 20.39 
2009 Reduction to 5.04 8.45 17.79 20.39 
2009 Reduction to 4.50 8.30 19.02 19.71 
2011 Reduction to 4.50 8.59 20.15 21.04 
2018 Cap at 2.0 vice 3.0 8.31 21.03 21.49 
The path of emissions (and of marginal costs) is unchanged: it starts at 8.45 
million tons and falls steadily to the eventual cap of 3.0 million tons, which is 
reached in 2022, exactly as in the base case. All that is different is that the 
maximum level of the bank is less, although it is exactly what it is in the base 
case at the end of 2008, because there is one less year to build up the bank. The 
draw down starts a year earlier, but the amount drawn down in 2009 is exactly 
offset by the smaller amounts that need to be drawn down in the years 2010 
through 2017 because of the higher cap. 
The other variations in Table 3 illustrate the same basic result. Moving the 2010 
reduction in the cap forward one year (without an offsetting increase in the 2010-
17 cap) increases the required cumulative emission reduction and thereby calls 
forth more abatement at the beginning, which leads to lower emissions and 
higher costs throughout the banking period. The maximum bank is less and the 
banking period is shorter because there is less time to over-control and 
accumulate allowances. Conversely, deferring the 2010 cap reduction by one 
year requires less cumulative abatement and therefore leads to higher initial 
emissions, lower costs throughout the banking period, a larger peak bank, and a 
longer banking period. Finally, reducing the 2018 cap to 2.0 million tons instead 
of 3.0 million tons increases required abatement during the banking period, as 
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well as ever after, and leads to lower emissions, higher costs, a larger bank, and 
a longer banking period than in the base case. 
A Higher Discount Rate 
By any comparison with the past thirty years, current interest rates are low and it 
could be argued reasonably that a more appropriate discount rate, representing 
what might be applied on average throughout the future banking period, would be 
higher. Accordingly, the only sensitivity case tested for the discount rate is a 
higher one, of 6.0%, one-third higher than today’s risk-free rate for a five-year 
holding, but one closer to the norm during the 1990s. The effect on emissions 
and banking is shown on Figure 5.  
Figure 5: Emissions, Caps, and the Bank
(r = 6.0%, g = 2.0%)
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Unlike changes in the level and timing of the reduced caps, a change in the 
discount rate affects the base case or what would occur without any reduction in 
the cap. Since a higher discount rate gives more weight to near costs and less to 
distant costs, less will be abated currently, the inherited bank will be drawn down 
more quickly, and the banking period will end sooner, even though the required 
reduction remains unchanged. Thus, as indicated by the before cases in Figures 
3 and 5, initial emissions would be 10.95 million tons with a 6.0% discount rate 
instead of 10.28 million tons with 4.5% and the banking period would end in 2010 
instead of 2014.  
The proposed reduction of the cap will still lead to more abatement currently and 
throughout the banking period, but not as much will be banked in the period 
through 2009 and the banking period will be shorter. As illustrated by Figure 5, 
the increase in initial abatement, and corresponding reduction in initial emissions, 
is 1.1 million tons instead of the 1.8 million tons that occurs with the lower 4.5% 
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discount rate. The banking period is extended to 2016 and then there is a small 
second banking period surrounding the 2018 reduction in the cap.9  Moreover, 
the bank will continue to be drawn down for several more years, albeit at a 
slower rate. When the new accumulation phase begins in a few years, the bank 
is built up roughly to its end-of-Phase I level of almost 12 million tons before then 
being rapidly depleted beginning in 2010.  
A higher discount rate has two opposing effects on the value of the existing 
allowance endowment. Because not as much current abatement is warranted, 
the marginal cost of abatement and the value of each Class 1 allowance is less 
than when the discount rate is 4.5%. However, the share of the Class 1 
allowances in the total value of the endowment is greater so that the smaller 
increase in value of a larger share leads to less of a loss in total endowment 
value, 27%, instead of 29% as occurs with a 4.5% discount rate. 
Lower Growth in Counterfactual Emissions 
One of the most difficult parameters to estimate is the rate of growth in 
counterfactual emissions, or what emissions would be if the Title IV and the 
proposed reduced caps were not in place. This rate reflects assumptions about 
growth in the American economy, the role of electricity in that growth, and the 
share of coal-fired electricity, which depends heavily upon relative price 
comparisons between coal and natural gas, as well as the competitiveness of 
coals of differing sulfur content in coal markets independently of sulfur content.10 
The rate used in the base case, 2.0%, is in fact less than has occurred since the 
year before Title IV went into effect. As of 2000, heat input at Title IV affected 
units has increased at a rate of 3.2% per annum and, based upon the emission 
rates prevailing before these units became subject to Title IV, counterfactual 
emissions would have increased by 2.5% per annum.11 Still, this may seem to 
many to be a high rate of growth and Figure 6 illustrates the effect of a 1.0% rate 
of growth in counterfactual emissions as might be the case with relatively low 
natural gas prices, marked improvements in the efficiency of power plants, or 
less growth in the demand for electricity.  
                                                 
9  This mini-banking period around 2018 deserves some note. It occurs because of two conditions. First, the 
6% discount rate is not low enough to extend the banking period occasioned by the 2010 reduction of the 
cap beyond 2017. Second, the 6% discount rate is lower than the 7% difference in marginal costs in 2018 
between the 4.5 million ton and the 3.0 million ton caps.  
10  As discussed in Ellerman and Montero (1998), SO2 emission declined considerably in the years before 
Phase I began because reductions in rail rates made low sulfur coal from the Powder River Basin 
economically competitive in the Midwest on the basis of its Btu value alone. 
11  The rate of increase in counterfactual emissions is less than the rate of increase in heat input because 
generation has shifted to lower emitting units. Some of this shift may be due to Title IV. 
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Figure 6: Emissions, Caps, and the Bank
(r = 4.5%, g = 1.0%)
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The primary effect of a lower rate of growth in counterfactual emissions is to 
reduce the required abatement over all time periods. Less abatement will be 
required at the end of the banking period and that in turn implies less abatement 
and lower costs over all time periods. Less required abatement also implies a 
shorter banking period and less of a re-accumulation of allowances in 
anticipation of the 2010 reduction in the cap. When compared with the 2.0%-
growth case, the end-of-2009 bank is 13 million tons instead of 20 million tons 
and the existing bank will be drawn down some more before re-accumulation 
starts. The initial increases in abatement and in marginal abatement cost due to 
the proposed reduction in the SO2 cap are less than if counterfactual emissions 
were growing at 2% per annum: 1.25 million tons of abatement instead of 1.75 
million tons, and a 19% increase in marginal abatement cost instead of 26%.  
Finally, the loss in the value of the allowance endowment is less in percentage 
terms: 24% in the 1.0%-growth case instead of 29% in the base case.  The 
endowment is worth less when counterfactual emissions are growing at 1%, and 
the loss of value due to a reduction of the cap is less due to an effect similar to 
that of a higher discount rate. Because marginal costs are not increasing as 
rapidly in the far years (while still being discounted at the same discount rate), 
Class 2 and Class 3 allowances account for less of total endowment value in the 
1%-growth case. Thus, even though the increase in the price of each Class 1 
allowance is less, the loss in total endowment value is not as great because the 
classes losing value constitute a smaller share of total value. 
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Conclusion 
The most important result emerging from this analysis is not that costs will 
increase with a reduction of the SO2 cap. This is obvious. The main lesson is that 
banking will distribute the costs of a reduction in the cap over many years 
beginning in the present, including before the reduction is enacted, and 
extending to several years after the last reduction of the cap. Even so, and with 
all the uncertainties about discount rates, rates of growth in counterfactual 
emissions, and the level and timing of the reduced caps, several robust 
conclusions emerge.  The banking period will certainly be extended and a new 
phase of accumulation will begin, if not immediately, then in a few years. 
Although some of the emission reduction and the resulting cost increase will 
occur immediately, most of these effects will be felt in the later years. The exact 
balance between near and far abatement and cost will depend upon the discount 
rate whose main role is to determine the rate at which the economy absorbs the 
higher cost implied by the reduced cap. 
This redistribution of the cost burden through banking will be efficient from an 
economic point of view; and it will be advantageous from an environmental point 
of view in that the required emission reduction will take place sooner than it 
would without banking. The introduction of this proposal does however introduce 
a new element of volatility into SO2 allowance markets as expectations of 
enactment enter into the formation of current prices. It is possible that the 
prospects of enactment will grow steadily stronger over time so that the 
incorporation of these expectations into current prices will create an efficient 
transition, but it is at least as likely that those prospects will wax and wane as the 
legislative process is engaged with resultant effects on allowance prices and 
abatement effort. 
The President’s proposal also introduces a new wrinkle in emissions trading, 
namely, the effect on the value of the SO2 allowances that have already been 
distributed under the existing provisions of Title IV. The value of the existing 
endowment will be reduced by 25% to 30%, but the important issue is how the 
final legislation will deal with the coverage ratios of the allowances already 
distributed. Nothing in the law prohibits Congress from revising, or even revoking, 
these quasi-property rights, but how the revision is handled will make a large 
difference in emission outcomes, especially over the next few years.  Title IV 
continues, of course, and the existing allowances will be required for coverage of 
SO2 emissions with each succeeding year; but there should be no doubt that, if 
the ability to cover emissions of currently banked allowances, or those that would 
be banked prior to the proposed reduction in the emissions cap, is threatened, 
currently banked allowances will be used and little banking would occur between 
the present and the time of the first reduction in the cap. The consequences 
would to increase emissions in the near term and to lose the economc 
advantages of banking both prospectively and as has occurred to date under 
Title IV.  
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Finally, lest any reader give too much importance to the numbers provided here, 
which are intended to be both indicative and realistic, mention must be made of 
two important considerations that have not been included. First, the extent to 
which abatement technology may change over the economically relevant horizon 
has not been incorporated into the analysis. These changes can be expected to 
be cost-reducing; and to the extent that they are, future costs will not be as great 
is indicated in the preceding analysis. Moreover, if these changes in technology 
are correctly anticipated and incorporated into price expectations, current costs 
will be lower, and emissions higher, than they would otherwise be. 
The second excluded factor is the effect of the NOx and mercury caps that would 
accompany the proposed reduction in the SO2 cap. On the one hand, the caps 
on these other two pollutants will surely add to the total costs facing electric 
utilities and consumers. On the other hand, the sources are the same industrial 
processes and actions to abate one pollutant will often reduce emissions of the 
other so that the cost will not be as great as it would be if each cap were 
considered independently. Even without inter-pollutant trading, there is every 
reason to believe that agents will take all interaction effects into account in 
deciding how to attain the three caps jointly and that these actions will depend on 
the value of allowances in the three independent but related markets.  No 
attempt has been made here to consider these interaction effects, but they 
promise to be important and to offer a rich field for analysis. 
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